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Globalisation	is	affecting	our	lives,	our	institutions	and	our	natural	environment.	Global	firms	play	a	key	role	in	this
historical	change.	In	an	open,	globalized	economy,	large	business	firms	take	a	world	view	about	the	opportunities
which	present	themselves.	Some	states	offer	a	legal	environment	which	is	pollution	friendly.	Others	offer	the
services	of	their	workforce	at	a	discount.	Others	specialize	in	the	offering	of	tax	schemes	making	it	possible	to
substantially	reduce	tax	bills.	The	UK	and	the	City	of	London	have	been	particularly	efficient	at	creating	on-shore
what	is	being	perceived	as	off-shore	finance.	All	this	is	of	course	at	the	expense	of	the	effectiveness	of	the	political
institutions	trying	to	protect	their	populations	and	natural	environment.	Their	ability	to	adopt	protective	local	rules	is
reduced	and	their	financial	means	are	being	eroded	via	a	global	game	of	tax	base	and	profit	shifting.
This	evolution	is	not	a	consequence	of	‘market’	forces.	To	start	with,	according	to	an	UNCTAD	2018	report,	80%	of
cross	border-trade	is	in	fact	intra-firm	trade.	What	appears	as	being	international	exchange	is	in	fact	exchange
internal	to	firms,	to	organizations.	International	trade	is	mostly	organized	trade	–	trade	organized	by	large	firms.	The
decisions	leading	to	the	present	state	of	affairs	are	therefore	not	made	via	the	anonymous	choices	of	market	actors.
They	are	made	within	business	organizations,	within	firms	optimizing	their	operations,	from	their	own	perspectives,
using	the	worldwide	menu	of	state-offered	legal	dishes.
There	is	a	general	sentiment	that	the	present-day	economic,	financial	and	political	systems	are	out	of	control.	But	a
clear	view	as	to	the	origin	of	these	issues	and	what	can	be	done	about	them	is	lacking.	What	I	propose	is	a	new
method	of	analysing	the	co-development	of	economic	and	political	institutions	which	offers	pathways	out	of	the	dire
straits	in	which	we	are.
The	notion	of	property	is	a	central	concept	in	this	new	analysis.	Contrary	to	common	sense,	property	is	not	a	direct
relationship	between	a	person	and	a	thing.	Property	is	not	a	‘state	of	nature’	reality;	it	is	a	highly	sophisticated	mode
of	social	relationships.	What	property	really	means	is	that	in	connection	with	any	object	of	property,	the	owner	has	a
right	of	decision-making	as	a	matter	of	principle	in	connection	with	the	object	of	property.	Laws	come	only	as
limitations,	as	a	matter	of	exception,	to	the	autonomy	of	the	owner.
This	modern	notion	of	property	was	progressively	intellectually	developed	up	to	its	institutionalization	at	the	end	of
the	eighteenth	century.	The	political	purpose	behind	this	notion	was	to	make	of	the	individual	owner	a	small-scale
sovereign,	with	full	autonomy	to	make	decisions	about	the	use	of	their	property.	For	some,	the	issue	was	one	of
efficiency:	property	allows	making	decisions	in	connection	with	the	use	of	things	without	palaver.	And	the	owner
bears	the	consequences,	positive	or	negative,	of	his	or	her	actions	in	connection	with	the	object	of	property.		For
others,	what	was	at	stake	was	the	autonomy	of	the	individual	and	the	provision	of	the	means	to	enable	owners	to
develop	their	own	oneness.	These	are	in	a	sense	the	two	roots	of	the	liberal	system,	with	individual	owners	as
primary	decision-makers,	and	the	rules	of	society,	mostly	via	law,	coming	as	exceptional	derogations	to	this
autonomy.
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In	this	system	of	allocation	of	prerogatives	in	connection	with	the	use	of	property	rights,	owners	are	legally	placed	in
a	more	favourable	position	than	non-owners.	Irrespective	of	the	widely	shared	belief	that	there	is	equality	among
individuals	in	a	liberal	legal	system,	the	reality	is	that	owners	can	hire	and	fire	in	connection	with	the	use	of	their
objects	of	property	and	that	they	can	organize	producing	activities.	Owners	order	and	non-owners	obey.	Of	course,
this	is	window-dressed	by	contracts,	such	as	employment	contracts.	But	the	inequality	in	property	rights	translates
into	an	inequality	in	day-to-day	life	for	most	of	us.	The	autonomy	of	some	is	the	heteronomy	of	the	many.
A	key	to	the	understanding	of	the	evolution	of	our	societies	over	the	last	150	years	or	so	is	the	perception	of	the
importance	of	the	corporate	revolution.	In	purely	liberal	legal	systems,	business	corporations	are	viewed	with	much
suspicion	and	are	clearly	understood	as	potentially	very	powerful	organizations	which	can	prevent	the	normal
operation	of	a	liberal	society.	The	sources	of	worry	are	numerous.	In	particular,	shareholders	have	limited	liability,
which	is	an	issue	in	a	society	in	which	one	is	deemed	to	be	responsible	for	his	own	acts;	managers	are	going	to
make	decisions	in	connection	with	objects	of	property	they	do	not	own,	which	translates	into	complex	rules	of
allocation	of	duties	and	responsibilities;	there	is	no	limit	such	a	death	to	the	accumulation	and	concentration	of
objects	of	property	within	corporations;	they	may	end	up	being	very	powerful	organizations	challenging	the	authority
of	the	state.	And	so	on.	Treating	legal	fictions	as	real-life	individuals	was	perceived	as	inherently	problematic.
Our	forebears	were	very	much	aware	of	these	issues.	But	two	different	forces	combined	to	lead	to	a	worldwide
spreading	of	what	can	be	termed	the	corporate	system.	First,	the	financial	needs	arising	as	a	consequence	of	the
industrial	revolution,	be	it	in	infrastructure,	industrial	production,	large-scale	distribution,	insurance	and	so	on.	And
second,	the	international	competition	among	states	to	provide	the	legal	tools	requested	by	local	industrialists.	This
race-to-the-bottom	(or	towards	efficiency	for	some)	is	well	known	in	the	US	context.	In	a	federal	free	market,
businesses	had	the	liberty	to	incorporate	in	the	state	of	their	choice.	This	led	to	a	frenzy	competition	among	the
various	states	to	provide	businesses	with	the	freedom	to	incorporate.	What	used	to	be	a	privilege,	a	derogation	to
the	normal	rules	of	operation	of	the	economic/legal	system,	soon	became	a	right.	A	similar	process	took	place	in
Europe,	with	England	as	a	first	mover,	followed	by	continental	states	such	as	France	in	the	wake	of	the	extension	of
free	trade	treaties.
Today,	in	many	jurisdictions	of	the	world,	incorporation	requires	just	a	few	pounds	and,	in	a	few	seconds,	a	new
legal	person	is	created.	What	is	the	issue?		Large	organizations,	large	business	firms,	organize	themselves	legally
by	using	hundreds	of	subsidiaries	in	the	various	jurisdictions	of	the	world	to	optimize	the	allocation	of	their
resources,	the	accounting	of	their	performance	and	the	allocation	of	wealth	creation.	Large	groups	of	corporations,
each	one	of	them	being	a	separate	legal	person	with	the	same	rights	as	individuals	made	of	flesh	and	blood,	make
it	possible	to	legally	structure	large	organizations	which	do	not	have	any	legal	existence	as	such,	as	a	unity,	as	a
single	organization.	The	consequence	is	a	worldwide	disconnect	between	the	use	of	prerogatives,	the	rights	of
decision-making,	the	property	rights,	and	the	allocation	of	responsibilities	and	liabilities.
There	are	many	clear	examples	of	what	can	be	done	by	tweaking	the	corporate	organization	of	a	large	firm.	Jobs,
pollution	or	profits	can	be	easily	relocated.	So	much	so	that	depending	on	its	corporate	structure,	the	same
economic	organization	producing	the	same	number	of	widgets	over	a	period	of	time	can	lead	to	widely	different
outcomes	in	terms	of	environmental	and	social	impact,	and	in	terms	of	profit	measurement.
This	discrepancy	between	the	corporate	structure	of	groups	of	companies,	made	of	hundreds	of	legal	persons,	and
the	unity	of	operations	of	the	firms	existing	as	a	consequence	has	consequences	across	the	board.	Large	firms
have	concentrated	via	their	corporate	structure	the	rights	of	decisions-making	as	a	matter	of	principle	over
productive	assets.	They	have	concentrated	rights	of	autonomy,	sovereign	rights,	initially	designed	for	individuals.
Concentrated	within	organizations,	these	rights	take	on	a	brand-new	dimension.	They	give	firms	sovereign	powers
which	need	to	be	tamed	via	improved	governance	systems	and	a	more	inclusive	accounting	of	their	activities.	The
governance	of	our	society	is	deeply	impacted,	with	a	dramatic	erosion	of	the	Westphalian	state	system.
There	are	several	potential	means	of	action	to	adapt	to	this	new	reality.	One	of	them	is	an	improvement	of	the
accounting	system	which,	today,	can	evidence	the	existence	of	profits	while	firms	destroy	environmental	and	social
capital.	Beyond	the	accounting	of	the	operations	of	the	firms	in	terms	of	financial	capital	creation	or	destruction,	the
forms	of	capital	included	into	the	accounting	of	the	operations	must	now	include	social	and	environmental	capital.
The	development	of	proper	accounting	systems	suited	to	the	needs	of	a	globalized	society	is	particularly	required
given	the	seriousness	of	global	climate	disruption	and	the	quasi-impossibility	to	address	it	via	the	institutions	which
are	the	legacy	of	the	fading	state	system.
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Note:	the	above	summarises	some	of	the	arguments	in	the	author’s	new	book	Property,	Power	and	Politics	Why
We	Need	to	Rethink	the	World	Power	System	(Bristol	University	Press,	2020).
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